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Specialist palliative care (PC) often embraces a ‘‘less is more’’ philosophy that runs counter to the revenue-centric nature of most health care financing in
theU.S.A special business case is needed inwhich the financial benefits for organizations suchas hospitals andpayers are alignedwith the demonstrable
clinical benefits for patients. Based on published studies and our work with PCprograms over the past 15 years, we identified 10 principles that together
form a business model for specialist PC. These principles are relatively well established for inpatient PC but are only now emerging for community-based
PC. Three developments that are key for the latter are the increasing penalties from payers for overutilization of hospital stays, the variety of alternative
payment models such as accountable care organizations, which foster a population health management perspective, and payer-provider partnerships
that allow for greater access to and funding of community-based PC. J Pain Symptom Manage 2015;50:741e749.  2015 The Authors.
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In his famous ‘‘Escape Fire’’ speech, Dr. Donald Ber-
wick diagnosed the foundational problems with the
U.S. health care system and articulated a vision for
its transformation. He stated that for a comprehensive
solution to succeed and be broadly adopted today, it
must make sense from four distinct perspectives:
Whatever ‘‘escape fire’’ [revolutionary innovation] we
create has to make sense in the world of science and
professionalism, in the world of the patient and family,
in the world of the business and finance of health care,
and in the world of the good, kind people who do the
work of caring. I think the toughest part of this may be
in terms of the business and financing of care. There is
a tendency to assume that financial successde.g.,
thriving organizationsdand great care are mutually
exclusive. However, we will not make progress unless
and until these goals become aligned with each
other.’’1Address correspondence to: J. Brian Cassel, PhD, 1101 E
Marshall Street, Box 980230, Richmond, VA 23298, USA.
E-mail: JBCassel@VCU.edu
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of American
Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).This is certainly true of the field of palliative care
(PC). The clinical-moral imperative that has driven
innovators and practitioners in the field is necessary
but insufficient for catalyzing and sustaining wide-
spread investment in PC programs. Unless and until
stakeholdersdhealth system administrators, physi-
cians, and payersdperceive a clear path to the finan-
cial viability of specialist PC programs, they will not
support fully the development of such services.2,3
Clinical leaders who have struggled for years to
garner support for PC services can attest to the
degree to which the misalignment of clinical and
financial incentives has stymied the creation and
expansion of specialist PC services. This phenome-
non has been explored in at least one national study:
in a survey of cancer centers in the U.S., financial is-
sues were the most-often perceived barrier to PC pro-
gram implementation.4Accepted for publication: July 7, 2015.
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Why is there such misalignment between clinical
and financial interests? The U.S. health care system
is fundamentally rooted in a fee-for-service (FFS)
model, where third parties compensate providers
for each service delivered to patients. In such a sys-
tem, there is a direct correlation between the quan-
tity and intensity of health care provided and the
amount of revenues collected by systems and individ-
ual providersdmore activity (procedures, tests, and
hospitalizations) results in more revenue. In contrast,
the field of PC uses a ‘‘less is more’’ philosophy,
where attention to patient and family needs and clar-
ification of care goals often lead to reduced use of
the most expensive health care services (such as inpa-
tient admissions and emergency department [ED]
visits) and increased use of less expensive services
(such as home-based services).
With hospice, insurers cut through this obstacle by
offering an entirely separate benefit that is mutually
exclusive with continuation of disease-focused health
care. The business case for specialist PC outside of
hospice is more complex and more subtle, in part
because PC needs to be provided concurrently with
disease-focused therapies, rather than in the ‘‘either/
or’’ forced choice inherent in the current regulations
of the Medicare Hospice Benefit.
From the perspective of a hospital entrenched in the
FFS reimbursement model, shifting activity away from
hospital care does not make much financial sense. In a
description of the Advanced Illness Management Pro-
gram developed by SutterHealth, a program leader
noted that although the intervention was successful in
increasinghospice utilization, reducing hospitalizations
and lowering costs of care, the misalignment of quality
and financial incentives posed a serious challenge:
‘‘The current reimbursement system does not pay for
Advanced Illness Management-type services, such as
care coordination and hospital-to-home transition.
Reduced hospitalizations cost Sutter hospitals more in
lost revenue than they gain from dollar savings.’’5
The goal of this article is to help insurance and hos-
pital executives, PC leaders, and policy makers to un-
derstand the extent to which the clinical/moral and
financial imperatives for PC are actually aligned and
the congruence between positive clinical and financial
outcomes. Although numerous studies have docu-
mented the impact of PC on costs,6e9 no prior article
has presented a comprehensive assessment of the
financial or business imperative for PC and how it
could be aligned with the clinical/moral imperative.
Drawing on the published literature and our technical
assistance work with hundreds of PC programs over
the past 15 years, we articulate the 10 principles that
together create the economic rationale for specialistteams to provide an additional layer of support for pa-
tients (and families) facing progressive life-limiting
diseases. These principles also refer to and reflect
the increasing importance of the pay-for-quality move-
ment that is slowing supplanting the FFS model.The 10 Principles of the Business Case for PC
Principle 1: Persons with serious illness, especially
those with progressive life-limiting diseases [and their
families] are at risk for pain and suffering from multi-
ple sources; PC helps prevent or improve those
outcomes.
The business case for specialist palliative care (SPC)
begins with the clinical case. Without a clinical imper-
ative, there would be no need for a financial model;
recall that the national Medicare Hospice Benefit fol-
lowed (by eight years) the founding of the first hos-
pice in the U.S. Voluminous evidence speaks to the
extent to which patients with serious illness and their
families suffer; there is equally strong and abundant
evidence of how SPC services help to mitigate or
even prevent that suffering.10e16
Principle 2: Persons with progressive life-limiting dis-
eases often have heavy utilization of expensive health
care services (e.g., ED visits, frequent and lengthy hos-
pital admissions), some of which are avoidable. These
utilization patterns are often evident in the last months
of life but may occur earlier in the disease course.
The literature on this, too, has become voluminous;
three studies are worth highlighting. A recent study
showed that one-half of older Americans go to a hospi-
tal ED in the last month of life; once there, three-
quarters are hospitalized; and of those hospitalized,
more than two-thirds die in the hospital.17 For three
major diseases, Medicare patients are increasingly
receiving intensive care unit (ICU) care in the last
month of life, and more than one-quarter of those
dying in hospice care have received hospice for less
than three days.18 This utilization of hospital services
at the very end of life would be acceptable if such
care was aligned with patient and family preferences.
Unfortunately, this is not the case: studies continue
to show that the proportion of people who die in hos-
pitals and nursing homes exceeds the proportion of
those who identify these sites as their preferred loca-
tion of death.19 Worldwide, more than 80% of people
want to die at home.20
Principle 3: Hospitalizations toward the end of life
tend to be lengthy and costly; these can result in nega-
tive fiscal outcomes for hospitals and payers, in both
FFS and risk-based revenue models.
Published studies have documented the duration
and cost of hospitalizations near the end of life, which
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on either hospital costs or on payer expenditures do
not in themselves describe whether the reimburse-
ment from payers to hospitals results in positive or
negative financial outcomes for the hospitalsdare
they breaking even or experiencing positive or nega-
tive margins? One needs to know both parts of the
equation, but such results are not usually published.
To understand the magnitude of financial risk for
both payers and providers, we present below some
data from the Virginia Commonwealth University
(VCU) Health System, which contrasts hospital costs
and reimbursements (payer expenditures) across
three groups of Medicare beneficiaries: those who
died in the hospital, those with very serious illness
and high mortality risk, and all other admissions
(Fig. 1).
Reimbursement for the cases in the first two groups
(deaths and high-risk survivors) is around three times
greater than that seen in the ‘‘all other’’ group, repre-
senting the burden on Medicare; but even more strik-
ing is that Medicare’s reimbursement falls short of the
actual costs incurred by the hospital. The net loss for
hospitalizations of Medicare patients at this hospital
for that year was driven entirely by the 16% of cases
that ended in death or had high risk of deathdcases
that may be PC relevant.
Another analysis of VCU data depicts the worsening
net margin among cancer and congestive heart failure
(CHF) admissions in the six months before death
(Fig. 2). As this graph indicates, the FFS reimburse-
ment model for inpatient care does not guarantee a
positive net margin. With the inpatient prospective
payment system that Medicare uses (and which is
emulated by many other payers), the amount of reim-
bursement per case is predetermined by the clinical
and utilization characteristics that are used in the
diagnosis-related group (DRG) classification system.
Within any given DRG, a hospital may have a positive
net margin if their costs are low but a negative margin
if their costs exceed the predetermined payment.Fig. 1. Inpatient admissions of Medicare patients at Virginia
Commonwealth University hospital in Fiscal Year 2011, strat-
ified by their disposition at discharge: deaths, survivors with
high risk of mortality, and all others. aHigh-risk survivors
defined as discharged to hospice or those with all patient
refinedediagnosis-related group risk of mortality score of 4
combined with severity of illness score of 3 or 4. bNet margin
represents revenues less total costs.Hospitals may be unaware of the extent to which
end-of-life care is driving such losses; in our experi-
ence, most hospitals conduct their financial analyses
by major disease groups (e.g., cancer, cardiology,
neurological) and not in terms of disease course. As
pay-for-performance and shared savings programs
become more prevalent, financial analytics will have
to adopt this population health management
perspective.
Analyses such as these may reveal previously under-
appreciated financial risks for hospitals regarding the
unprofitability of near-end-of-life hospitalizations (i.e.,
those ending in death or that occur in the last few
months of life). It may be that some hospitals would
rather examine contribution margin (reimbursement
minus direct costs) rather than net margin (reim-
bursement minus total costs), but the principle is
the samedlong resource-intensive admissions toward
the end of life may not be generating the kind of pos-
itive net margin that hospitals see for the bulk of their
admissions. Further research is certainly warranted on
this issue of the net margin for hospitalizations near
the end of life, taking into account both hospital costs
incurred and payer expenditures.
Principle 4: Hospitals are penalized by payers,
notably the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), for high 30-day readmission rates,
30-day mortality rates, and similar measures; a signifi-
cant portion of this is driven by care at the end of life.
In a major shift, CMS is now penalizing hospitals for
excessive rates of hospitalizations associated with poor
coordination of care (high readmission rates) and
poor quality (high 30-day mortality rates). Medicare
has two separate programs in effect. In the Readmis-
sion Reduction Program at issue is the rate of readmis-
sions within 30 days for initial hospitalization for
specific conditions or procedures.23 When the pro-
gram started in federal fiscal year (FFY) 2013, the pen-
alties were as much as a 1% reduction in DRG
payments, and penalties have increased to up to 3%
for FFY 2015. It is important to note that the penalty
affects all Medicare hospitalizations for a given hospi-
tal, not just the conditions used to measure perfor-
mance. The Kaiser Foundation reports that 2610
hospitals are being fined in 2014 and that 39 hospitals
are receiving the highest penalty of 3% of payments.24
In Maryland, the last state in which Medicare pays for
hospitalizations without DRGs, reimbursement is now
fixed per hospital per year so that Medicare will not
pay for any additional hospitalizations, thus having
the same effect.25
The second program is the Value-Based Purchasing
Program, which increases or reduces payments to
acute-care hospitalsdup to 1.25% currently,
increasing to a maximum of 2.0% by FFY 2017.26 An
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on process measures, outcome measures (including
30-day mortality rates for three conditions), and pa-
tient experience (satisfaction); outcome measures
recently increased to 40% of the total score. Like the
readmission program, Value-Based Purchasing affects
all acute care payments from Medicare for a given hos-
pital, not just payments for the conditions used in the
metrics.
From a hospital finance perspective, a single end-of-
life hospitalization can have all three unwanted char-
acteristics: it can produce a negative net margin, it
can be a readmission from a prior hospitalization,
and it can be associated with death within 30 days.27
Led by CMS, the largest health care payer in the
U.S., payers are slowly shifting from paying for quan-
tity to paying for quality; CMS has announced that by
the end of 2018, 50% of Medicare payments will be
tied to quality or value28 through alternative payment
models or value-based payments. The implications
for hospitals are clear: business as usual is beginning
to shift, opening up greater alignment between the
clinical and nonclinical outcomes for the field of
PC (although some of the metrics used by CMS to
date focus on sudden conditions such as acute
myocardial infarction for which PC is not involved).
PC has always been associated with quality and has
been shown to have a mitigating effect on overutiliza-
tion of some types of health services. Indeed, many
measures of quality, such as those endorsed for
cancer end-of-life care by the National Quality
Forum,29 make an explicit link between quality andoverutilization of some types of health care services
(hospitalizations, ICU stays, and ED visits) and un-
derutilization of other services (such as hospice and
PC). The attention that payers are giving to measures
of overutilization presents a clear opportunity to the
PC field, which can demonstrate that some of these
admissions and readmissions near death could be
avoided through better outpatient and home-based
care. This represents a different interpretation of
what kind of quality the 30-day mortality measure
purports to be monitoring.30 A high rate of 30-day
mortality for CHF admissions may not represent
poor quality of inpatient CHF care; but it could very
well represent poor quality of ambulatory CHF care
or inadequate access to early PC.
Principle 5: Community-based PC (CBPC) improves
symptoms, coordinates care, and reduces ED visits
and hospitalizations in the months before death.
Hospice care is being used very close to the time of
death,18,31 and inpatient PC can only be provided
once patients are hospitalized. Thus, there is a pro-
found need for nonhospice PC to be provided in
the weeks and months before death, in settings
outside the inpatient hospitaldwhat is being termed
CBPC. Rabow et al.32 summarized the evidence that
CBPC reduces hospital utilization while improving
patient-reported outcomes, such as distress, symptom
management, and satisfaction with health care. Dra-
matic growth and interest in CBPC in the past few
years is driven by the recognition that inpatient PC
alone is insufficient and by the compelling evidence
from randomized controlled trials of home-based
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the financial implications of CBPC in Principle 9.
Principle 6: Inpatient PC improves symptoms, coordi-
nates care, and reduces the cost of hospital admissions
that do occur.
Numerous studies provide evidence that inpatient
PC consultation services and units improve
symptoms10e13,35 and reduce hospital costs6e9,36 in
the days after consultation, and this finding is not
limited to decedents.37 The key to understanding
the business case for inpatient PC is to understand
whose costs are saveddare hospital cost savings passed
on to payers? Largely, nodbecause of the payer mix,
payers’ reimbursement structures for inpatient care,
and the timing of PC involvement within a
hospitalization.9
 Payer mix. According to one multisite study,
the payer mix for inpatient PC is about 70% Medi-
care, 11% Medicaid, and less than 20% all
otherdcommercial, health maintenance organi-
zations, preferred provider organization, Tricare,
self-pay, indigent, and so on.38
 Structure of reimbursement for the predominant payers.
Medicare and most states’ Medicaid reimburse-
ment for hospital care is paid through DRGs or
similar per-case mechanisms.39
 Timing. Extended lengths of stay are often a
trigger for PC consultation,40,41 and several arti-
cles have described a significant proportion of
PC referrals occurring only after a week or more
of hospitalization has passed.38,42e45
Consider a scenario in which a patient was admitted
to the ICU from the ED and remained in that unit until
the PC team was consulted on hospital day 8. The PC
intervention could reduce costs in the days after consul-
tation but could not affect the costs of procedures or
ICU use that occurred during the first eight days: and
it is very likely that the patient’s diagnosis and the
utilization that occurred in hospital days 1e8 would
determine the DRG designation and, therefore, reim-
bursementdthese would not be changed by a PC inter-
vention that began on day 8. If the PC intervention
results in clarification of goals and alteration of treat-
ment plans such that the patient is transferred out of
the ICU and into a less expensive unit, the cost savings
that the hospital sees are real, because the payment is
already fixed (set) regardless of actual costs. Conversely,
in such a scenario, cost savings would not be passed on
too payers who use a DRG-based fixed payment system
because their payment or expenditure was prospec-
tively determined and is not linked to the details of
the services rendered.
There is some evidence that inpatient PC indirectly
helps to influence postdischarge utilization to theextent that it increases access to CBPC or hospice,42,46
and such changes would reduce payer costs. Similarly,
it is possible that PC involvement early in a hospitaliza-
tion could affect what procedures are done, thus
affecting the DRG assignment and payer expendi-
tures. But overall, there is a strong incentive for hospi-
tals, but no incentive or only a weak one for payers, to
invest in inpatient PC.
Principle 7: In the usual FFS model, third-party reve-
nue for PC services covers only a portion of the full
cost of a multidisciplinary PC team, so subsidies or
new contractual approaches are needed.
Services that are provided to patients with progres-
sive diseases often generate substantial clinical reve-
nues (e.g., chemotherapy for cancer; surgery and
implanted devices for cardiac care), whereas revenues
for PC are quite modest. CMS and most commercial
plans do not offer any supplemental payments or spe-
cial benefit packages to health systems for providing
PC. Specialists who can bill for their services are reim-
bursed at modest rates for evaluation and manage-
ment visits, but such billings are typically insufficient
to cover the entirety of salary and benefit costs of
the multidisciplinary team.47 This is the case for
both inpatient and community-based services. More-
over, some core PC team membersdregistered nurses,
many hospital-based social workers, and chaplainsd
cannot bill third parties despite their central role in
providing interdisciplinary PC. The inadequacy of
clinical revenue may be exacerbated by poor billing
practices48 and/or the increasingly competitive sal-
aries required for recruiting and retaining PC special-
ists. Therefore, specialist PC programs often need a
funding source other than (traditionally structured
and priced) clinical revenue to support the full costs
of their interdisciplinary teams.47
It is important that PC programs be able to describe
or project the cost of delivering care, as well as the
direct cost savings and indirect financial contributions
the program will make.43 Understanding the full cost
of the PC intervention and the full spectrum of
expected (or actual) benefits is a prerequisite to
securing program support from a health system or a
service contract from a payer. Tools are available to
help institutions estimate their costs and benefit.49,50
Principle 8: For hospitals, the combined value of
lower costs and operational impacts from inpatient
PC almost always exceed the cost of staffing the service
(positive return on investment); this would be appli-
cable in both FFS and risk-based revenue models.
Because inpatient PC reduces costs in the context of
case-rate payments (see Principles 3 and 6), and the
relative ease with which the cost reduction can be
measured and attributed to SPC involvement,7 it is
fairly easy for inpatient PC programs to demonstrate
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sidies needed for the multidisciplinary team. An
example in a published article was provided by
Morrison et al.,43 in which financial impact was
estimated at greater than four times more than the in-
vestment for program personnel. Similar estimates at
VCU have resulted in a return on investment of
greater than five times the investment. All that is
required is a quantification of two thingsdcost savings
caused by SPC involvement, and the annual amount of
PC program funding that is not covered directly by
third-party reimbursement.
Principle 9: The return on investment for CBPC de-
pends on the degree to which fiscal and quality incen-
tives are aligned; in general, entities that are at risk for
high cost care at the end of life have the greatest
incentive to invest in CBPC.
Although the return-on-investment analyses for
inpatient PC are relatively straightforward, the issue
is a bit more complex for CBPC. As shown in Principle
5, early engagement of PC may help to prevent hospi-
talizations by making them unnecessarydthrough bet-
ter symptom management and care coordination, for
example. From a payer perspective, the cost savings
may be real and significant, a circumstance that has fu-
eled a number of payer-provider partnerships to
deliver CBPC.51e54
Why would a health system or hospital invest in
such a CBPC program? One scenario is that the hos-
pital realizes that the status quo for end-of-life care is
resulting in negative net margins and that it is being
penalized for readmissions and 30-day mortality ad-
missions; even in a traditional FFS context, that hos-
pital may recognize that the clinical and financial
incentives for CBPC are already aligned (see Princi-
ples 3 and 5). Alignment is much more likely in hos-
pitals that are part of alternative payment
methodologies, such as health maintenance organi-
zations, shared savings programs, and accountable
care organizations (ACOs), in which there is a stron-
ger and more explicit reward for minimizing overuti-
lization of the costliest health care services.55 Indeed
the push to overcome barriers can come from health
plans, which have a strong interest in controlling
their expenditures, and providers.56e58
Although the primary purpose of CBPC is to proac-
tively manage symptoms, prevent and alleviate distress,
and coordinate care more effectively, there is a strong
need to align these patient-centered outcomes to an en-
tity’s financial interests to get programmatic supportd
budgetary, political, and operational. This must include
quantification of the costs and revenues associated with
reducing some forms of health care, such as hospitaliza-
tions; increased costs and revenues associated with
increasing other forms of health care (e.g., CBPC,home health, hospice); reductions in unwanted pen-
alties from overutilization (e.g., 30-day morality admis-
sions); and, where relevant, the financial rewards of
more efficient care, for example, when entities have
risk-bearing contracts, or are part of an ACO.
Health care reimbursement is a moving target. As
payers and providers continue to coevolve in the context
of their changing symbiotic relationships,wewill continue
to see new structures for sharing savings and sharing risk,
which create incentives for bending the cost curve while
maintaining quality and patient-centered outcomes.
Understanding the role of CBPC in this, and quantifying
projectedandactual impacts, is not aone-timeevent; it is a
process that must be done continually.
Principle 10: All types of health care organizations
can evaluate opportunities for and impact of PC.
Although much of the evidence cited here has come
from studies and systematic reviews conducted at aca-
demic centers, we believe that the essential pieces of
data could be analyzed by any community hospital, inte-
grated health system, or insurer. Many of the analyses
regarding inpatient PC are well established and have
been translated to inpatient SPC programs of all sizes
nationwide through the ‘‘Palliative Care Leadership Cen-
ter’’ technical assistance program, operated by the Cen-
ter to Advance Palliative Care since 2004.59 Emerging
data-based approaches to planning and evaluating
CBPC programs have been made available as well.49,50Use of These Principles
There are several ways that these principles can be
put to use. First, we would encourage researchers to
note that there are some principles for which the pub-
lished empirical evidence is rather thin. Three areas
stand out: the impact of CBPC in noncancer popula-
tions; how much of a PC program’s budget is covered
by clinical revenue (in the context of third-party reim-
bursement); and the worsening financial margin for
hospitalizations closer to the date of death (in the
context of third-party reimbursement). An obstacle
to research on the latter two is that health systems
treat their revenue data, and their net margin, with
greater secrecy than their cost data alone. But in the
FFS environment, knowing the costs of care relative to
revenue is a key issue in understanding the sustainabil-
ity of the status quo or of innovations.
Second, these principles can provide the frame-
work for program-specific business plans. Each
component of this model can draw on institutional
dataddescribing the clinical need for new or
expanded SPC services; the potential or actual
impact of inpatient and/or community-based SPC;
the anticipated or existing gap between third-party
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cost of various kinds of inpatient hospitalizations
and the use of hospital care in the months leading
up to death for various disease groups. These compo-
nents can then be pulled together into a cohesive
plan that makes a compelling argument for adminis-
trators to consider. It is important for SPC leaders to
understand these principles to make their case in a
clear and internally coherent way and equally impor-
tant to know where their institution stands in the
shifting health care reimbursement landscape. Is it
entrenched in the FFS model or transitioning to
the population health management and pay-for-
quality model? The answer will have significant impli-
cations for how much traction one can expect for
various pieces of the business case. It may be most
difficult to get traction for CBPC in an institution
that is firmly entrenched in the FFS modeldfor
example, not participating in ACOs or other payer
initiatives that would welcome more efficient
patient-centered health care.
Third, we have found repeatedly that neither re-
searchers nor hospital administrators necessarily
believe that research findings produced at another
institution are valid and relevant at one’s own. Local
data are almost always needed to make the business
case for such programs, and then published data are
used to validate and support the local findings. Howev-
er, any health system that uses this or a similar frame-
work should recognize that producing local evidence
for some of these principles (e.g., ED visits and hospi-
talizations increase in frequency and cost toward the
end of life) will demand some sophisticated financial
analyses. Technical assistance materials are now avail-
able from a variety of sources including the Center
to Advance Palliative care (https://www.capc.org),
the California State University Institute for Palliative
Care (csupalliativecare.org), and the California Coali-
tion for Compassionate Care (http://coaliti
onccc.org/tools-resources/palliative-care/).
Limitations
Beyond the paucity of evidence of some principles
as described earlier, the major limitation of this syn-
thetic review is that the findings cited are largely
from nonexperimental studies and thus subject to
the weaknesses inherent in observational research,
such as the potential for selection bias.60 Researchers
using nonexperimental methods have used several
techniques including the use of an instrument vari-
able and using propensity scores to control or select
matched comparison cases.61e64 A recent article that
used a large number of clinical and demographic
characteristics in its propensity-based matching found
a significant effect of PC involvement on cost reduc-
tion among hospitalized cancer patients.41Conclusions
In the U.S., health care is often performed as a set
of business transactions, and the health system is
both revenue centric and hospital centric. In that
context, the easiest innovations for providers (physi-
cians and hospitals) to implement are those that
generate more revenue from payers than the costs
the providers incur. A special business case for PC is
necessary because the specialist teams cost more
than they produce directly in revenue, and in fact
PC involvement may reduce hospitalizations, which
are the primary source of revenue for hospitals.
The U.S. health care system may be unique in the
extent to which it applies capitalistic principles to
health care, but the development of PC is a global
phenomenon. Some of the principles are universal-
dsuch as the clinical imperativedwhereas others
may be uniquely relevant in the FFS context that un-
derlies so much of the U.S. health care system.
The business case for inpatient SPC is well estab-
lished and is reflected in the rapid growth of SPC pro-
grams in more than 60% of U.S. hospitals.65 The
business case for community-based SPC is emerging
and is most relevant where health systems are partner-
ing with payers to deliver more efficient patient-
centered high-quality care.Disclosures and Acknowledgments
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